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Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor's
Rocky Shore
By Wendy Gerwick Couture*
I. Introduction
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act creates a safe harbor
that protects companies and individuals, under certain circumstances,
from liability under the securities acts for making misleading state-
ments that qualify as “forward-looking.” Courts interpreting this
statutory safe harbor are divided about how to treat mixed state-
ments, in which statements about the past or the present are inter-
twined with statements about the future. This essay identies three
categories of mixed statement that are the subject of frequent litiga-
tion, demonstrates the courts' disagreement about how to treat these
categories of statements, and — drawing from the statutory text and
policy rationales — recommends whether the safe harbor should ap-
ply to each category of statement.
In particular, this essay argues that (1) statements of historical or
current fact that underlie predictions should not be protected by the
safe harbor; (2) statements about the present that necessarily
incorporate predictions should be protected by the safe harbor; and (3)
statements that contain both present and future components should
be bifurcated, with the safe harbor protecting only those portions that
predict.
In addition to providing guidance to future courts, litigators, and
companies making disclosures, this essay's arguments are responsive
to the current literature about the safe harbor. Commentators have
noted the confusing precedent in the area of mixed statements,1 and
scholars have recognized the importance of developing clear guidelines
to analyze substantively mixed statements.2 This essay responds to
this literature by identifying frequently litigated categories of mixed
statements and making recommendations for their consistent
treatment.
This essay proceeds in ve additional parts. Part II provides an
overview of the safe harbor, including the statute's denition of
“forward-looking statement.” Part III analyzes the safe harbor's ap-
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plicability to statements of historical or current fact that underlie
predictions. Part IV analyzes whether the safe harbor should protect
statements about the present that necessarily incorporate predictions.
Part V analyzes the safe harbor's applicability to statements contain-
ing both present and future components. Part VI briey concludes.
II. Overview of the Safe Harbor for “Forward-Looking State-
ments”
A. “Forward-Looking Statements” Are Aorded Special
Protection.
Congress, citing the importance of making “more information about
a company's future plans available to investors and the public,”
enacted a statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements.3 The
safe harbor, applicable in private securities actions premised on alleg-
edly misleading representations,4 encourages companies to issue
forward-looking statements by providing “certainty that forward-
looking statements will not be actionable by private parties under
certain circumstances.”5 Rather than refraining from voluntarily
disclosing predictive information for fear of future liability if the pre-
diction does not come to fruition, companies can now “disseminate rel-
evant information to the market without fear of open-ended liability.”6
This atmosphere of greater disclosure should “enhance market
eciency.”7
Under the safe harbor, statements qualifying as forward-looking
are not actionable if one of two prongs is satised.8 Under the rst
prong, a forward-looking statement is not actionable if the following
test is satised:
[T]he forward-looking statement is — (i) identied as a forward-looking
statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to dier
materially from those in the forward-looking statement.9
Mere boilerplate warnings do not qualify as “meaningful cautionary
statements.”10 Rather, the language must “convey substantive infor-
mation about factors that realistically could cause results to dier
materially from those projected in the forward-looking statement.”11 A
number of scholars have proposed guidelines for courts to apply when
analyzing whether warnings qualify as meaningful cautionary
statements.12
Under the second prong, a forward-looking statement is not action-
able if the plainti fails to prove that the statement “was made with
actual knowledge . . . that the statement was false or misleading.”13
The statutory text and accompanying legislative history conrm
that the two prongs of the safe harbor are disjunctive.14 First, the
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statute separates the two prongs of the safe harbor by the conjunction
“or” — not the conjunction “and.”15 Moreover, the Conference Report
characterizes the safe harbor as “bifurcated” and states that “[t]he
second prong of the safe harbor provides an alternative analysis.”16
Under this plain reading of the statute, a forward-looking statement
is protected, even if the speaker made it with actual knowledge of its
falsity, if the statement was identied as forward-looking and ac-
companied by meaningful cautionary language.
Despite this plain reading of the statute, a number of courts have
treated the second prong of the safe harbor as an exception to protec-
tion under the rst prong.17 For example, a district court in the
Southern District of California recently held:
[E]ven if these statements were subject to the safe harbor or bespeaks
caution doctrine and were accompanied by sucient cautionary state-
ments, as discussed above, the TAC adequately alleges a strong infer-
ence that they were made with actual knowledge of their falsity, preclud-
ing their protection by the safe harbor provision or bespeaks caution
doctrine.18
These courts' interpretation of the safe harbor, although perhaps sup-
ported by valid policy rationales,19 contravenes the plain language of
the statutory text.20
The characterization of statements as forward-looking is often
outcome-determinative in securities litigation. This is especially so if
courts treat the two prongs of the safe harbor as disjunctive. But even
if courts treat “actual knowledge” as an exception to protection under
the rst prong, this pleading burden is often insurmountable because
of the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements for scienter in secu-
rities fraud cases.21 Indeed, the number of securities class actions
complaints even alleging false forward-looking statements has steadily
declined from 71% in 2006 to 45% in 2010,22 suggesting that plaintis'
counsel are recognizing the fruitlessness of incorporating these allega-
tions in their complaints.
Moreover, Professor Ann Morales Olazabal has recognized the
danger of sweeping the “forward-looking statement” brush too
broadly.23 She explains that the safe harbor prefers “Type II errors,”
in which fraudulent statements are not actionable, over “Type I er-
rors,” in which non-fraudulent statements are actionable.24 Recogniz-
ing the potential negative impacts of Type II errors, she argues that
“[c]ourts can and should exercise caution not to be led down a path
that results in wholesale safe harbor protection of forward-looking
statements that are mixed.”25
Yet, despite the importance of the characterization of a statement
as “forward-looking,” relatively little attention has been paid to
identifying which statements, in particular, should be classied as
[Vol. 39:4 2011] Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor's Rocky Shore
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forward-looking.26 This essay seeks to ll that void.
B. The PSLRA denes “forward-looking statement.”
The PSLRA denes “forward-looking statement” as follows:
(A) [A] statement containing a projection of revenues, income
(including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share,
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other nancial
items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for
future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the
products or services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any
such statement contained in a discussion and analysis of nancial
condition by the management or in the results of operations included
pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to
any statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer,
to the extent that the report assesses a forward-looking statement
made by the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other
items as may be specied by rule or regulation of the Commission.27
The common element in this denitional list is the requirement that
the statement refer to a future, as opposed to a present or past, state
of aairs. In addition to the word “forward” in the phrase “forward-
looking statement,” the denition uses various terms to indicate that
the statement must refer to the future: “projection,” “future opera-
tions,” and “future economic performance.”
Indeed, most courts have little trouble distinguishing between
straightforward statements about the present or past and statements
about the future.28 A common test that courts apply is whether the
statement is “one whose truth cannot be determined until after the
statement is made.”29 For example, courts have not had any trouble
characterizing as forward-looking statements that “[t]otal losses on
these investments for the remainder of 2001 are expected to be
substantially lower than in the rst quarter”30 and that the company
is “expecting a very good year.”31 On the other hand, courts have
refused to characterize as forward-looking statements that business
was “ramping up fast or faster than expected;”32 about “current sales
and demand for Ceclor CD;”33 that a sales force transition was
“progressing nicely;”34 that “revenue for the second quarter had risen
4%;”35 that “we are not overinventoried anywhere;”36 that “we still
think the stock is undervalued;”37 and that “our China ramp is
proceeding on plan.”38
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The denition of “forward-looking statement” is unclear, however,
with respect to three types of mixed statements: (1) statements of
historical or present fact underlying predictions; (2) statements about
the present that necessarily incorporate predictions; and (3) state-
ments containing present and future components.39 Courts' treatment
of these types of statements has been inconsistent. This essay will ad-
dress each in turn.
III. Statements of Historical or Present Fact Underlying
Predictions
Take as an example the following statement: “Based on current rec-
ord levels of demand, we predict demand to continue increasing
through the end of the scal year.” Does the statement about “current
record levels of demand” qualify as a forward-looking statement so
that it is protected from liability, even if current levels of demand are
not at record level?
The statutory text is unclear about how to treat statements about
the present or past that underlie a statement about the future. It
would be odd that statements about the present or past could qualify
as “forward-looking.” Yet, arguably, to the extent that these state-
ments underlie a statement about the future, they fall within the
scope of the statute's denition of “forward-looking statement.”
Subparagraph (D) of the denition includes “any statement of the as-
sumptions underlying or relating to any statement described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).”40 This “assumption” prong of the deni-
tion does not distinguish between assumptions about the future and
assumptions about the present or past. Indeed, in a case very similar
to the hypothetical example cited above, the court in In re Metawave
Communications Corp. Securities Litigation classied statements
about existing demand as forward-looking because “projections of
favorable results for the rest of 2001 [were based] on that demand.”41
A. Courts Are Split In Their Treatment of Statements of
Historical or Present Fact Underlying Predictions.
A number of courts, relying on the aforementioned “assumption”
prong of the denition, have applied the safe harbor to statements of
past or present fact that underlie predictions.42 For example, in Miller
v. Champion Enterprises, Inc., the Sixth Circuit recognized that the
phrase “given the continuation of outstanding earnings growth and
the successful implementation of our retail strategy” implied some
present facts, but the court nonetheless characterized the statement
as forward-looking because it was “the basis for later ‘forward-looking
statements,’ thus qualifying as an ‘assumption underlying’ a forward-
looking statement.”43 Applying this same reasoning, courts have ap-
plied the safe harbor to statements about the company's “revenue
[Vol. 39:4 2011] Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor's Rocky Shore
261© 2011 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Winter 2011
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1972380
results and product demand during the most recent quarter,”44 to the
statement that “we accomplished our major objectives . . . in 2002;”45
to the statement that “the defense [business] is up dramatically;”46
and to the statement that “Kenexa's brand recognition continues to
grow.”47
Other courts, rejecting this approach, have refused to apply the safe
harbor to statements of current or historical fact, even if predictions
are premised thereon.48 For instance, in In re Boeing Securities Litiga-
tion, the court refused to characterize statements about “present pro-
duction problems” as forward-looking, even though they underlay
predictions.49 Similarly, in Desai v. General Growth Properties, Inc.,
the court rejected the defendants' contention that the statements
“[w]e had oers from groups of life companies” and “we're in discus-
sions now on additional loans” were forward-looking because they
underlay defendants' predictions.50
B. Recommendation: Do Not Apply the Safe Harbor to Past
or Present Statements of Fact, Even if They Underlie
Predictions.
This essay, drawing from the text of the statute and policy
rationales, argues that courts should not apply the safe harbor to
statements of current or historical fact, even if predictions are based
thereon.
Let's apply this recommendation to the example cited above: “Based
on current record levels of demand, we predict demand to continue
increasing through the end of the scal year.”51 This essay contends
that the “current record levels of demand” component of the state-
ment should not qualify as a forward-looking statement, even though
it underlies the prediction of increasing demand. Therefore, if current
demand were not at record-level, the statement would potentially be
actionable.
1. The Text of the Statute Supports this Recommenda-
tion
The text of the statute applies explicitly only to “assumptions,”52
which arguably excludes veriable facts. For example, Webster's 3rd
New International Dictionary denes an assumption as “something
that is taken for granted: supposition.”53 Similarly, as dened in the
New Oxford American Dictionary, an assumption is dened as “a
thing that is accepted as true or as certain to happen, without proof.”54
Indeed, picking up on this connotation that an assumption is
something that must be supposed, the Boeing court distinguished be-
tween “assumptions” and “present facts”55 and the Desai court
distinguished between an “assumption” and “a pronouncement of
veriable (or refutable) existing fact.”56
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Moreover, read in context,57 this “assumption” prong of the statute
is arguably limited by the broader requirement that the statement be
“forward-looking.”58 The term “forward-looking statement” is not
meaningless in and of itself. Rather, it evokes a statement that looks
forward — to the future. Therefore, the “assumption” prong should
also be limited to those assumptions that look to the future.
Finally, this interpretation of the “assumption” prong as excluding
statements of historical or present fact does not render this prong
superuous.59 Some predictive statements are not captured by the
other prongs of the denition, which are limited to predictions about
certain topics, such as revenues, income, objectives of management for
future operations, and statements of future economic performance.60
Therefore, predictions about non-enumerated topics fall outside the
scope of the denition unless they are captured by the “assumption”
prong. Indeed, courts have already applied the “assumption” prong to
predictive statements that would otherwise fall outside the scope of
the safe harbor. For example, in Harris v. Ivax Corp., the Eleventh
Circuit characterized the prediction that “[r]eorders are expected to
improve as customer inventories are depleted” as a forward-looking
statement — not because the prediction itself fell within one of the
enumerated topics — but because it was an assumption underlying a
statement of future economic performance.61 Similarly, in In re Amylin
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation, the court characterized
the prediction that clinical testing of SYMLIN would be sucient to
support FDA approval as forward-looking — not because it, standing
alone, would qualify as a forward-looking statement — but because it
was an assumption underlying a forward-looking statement about
plans and objectives of management to submit a new drug application
to the FDA.62
2. Policy Rationales Support this Recommendation
Applying the safe harbor to statements of present or past fact would
not further Congress's intent in enacting the safe harbor. Congress's
primary concern when enacting the safe harbor for forward-looking
statements was encouraging companies to speak about the future
without fear that a subsequent turn of events could subject them to
liability.63 Statements about the present or past that underlie a state-
ment about the future do not implicate this policy concern because,
when making these types of statements, companies need not fear that
future events will render them incorrect. Companies can assess the
accuracy of statements about the present or past at the time of
speaking. Therefore, statements in this category need not be aorded
special safe harbor protection.
Moreover, interpreting the safe harbor as protecting statements of
current or historical fact, merely because a prediction is premised
[Vol. 39:4 2011] Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor's Rocky Shore
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thereon, would gut the securities fraud statute, placing almost every
statement out of its reach and compounding the “Type II” errors
identied by Professor Olazabal.64 The Boeing court recognized this
potentiality: “To interpret the safe harbor protection of underlying as-
sumptions in the manner suggested by the defendants would allow
the exception to swallow the rule. Virtually any factual assertion by a
business entity would be subject to safe harbor protection.”65 To allow
the safe harbor provision to insulate defendants from liability for
fraudulent statements of past or present fact would interfere with the
securities statutes' important role of maintaining “public condence in
the marketplace . . . by deterring fraud.”66
Finally, the application of the safe harbor to statements of present
or historical fact that underlie predictions would create perverse
incentives for companies to make forward-looking statements — not
for the goal of informing investors and the public, but merely in order
to protect themselves from liability with respect to their false state-
ments about the present or past. The In re Blockbuster Securities
Litigation court noted this potentiality: “Therefore, simply by making
nancial projections, a company would insulate itself from liability for
virtually all fraudulent statements and omissions because, in the se-
curities context, material statements and omissions are invariably re-
lated, at least tangentially, to a company's current and future nancial
position.”67
C. Query: Does the Safe Harbor Apply to Statements of
Opinion about the Present?
Even if courts adopt this essay's recommendation that statements
of past or present fact not be characterized as forward-looking via the
“assumptions” prong, an issue left undecided is whether statements of
opinion about the present should also be excluded from the denition.
This essay argues that, despite authority to the contrary, the safe
harbor should not apply to statements of opinion about the present
because they cannot be meaningfully distinguished from statements
of historical or current fact.
Several courts, while refusing to treat statements of veriable fact
as assumptions underlying predictions, have treated present state-
ments of opinion as forward-looking statements via the “assumptions”
prong. For example, the Desai court refused to treat statements of
veriable fact as assumptions underlying predictions.68 Yet, the court
held that the present-tense opinion that two mortgaged properties
were “two of our very best assets” was protected by the safe harbor
because it was an assumption that “explained the basis for the
forward-looking statement as to General Growth's renancing
prospects on these properties.”69
The distinction drawn by these courts fails to recognize that the
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truth or falsity of statements of present opinion, just like statements
of present or historical fact, does not depend on the occurrence of
future events. An opinion is false for purposes of securities fraud if
the speaker disbelieves the opinion (“subjective falsity”) and if it is
objectively unreasonable at the time spoken (“objective falsity”).70
Statements of present opinion do not implicate the policy rationales
underlying the safe harbor because future events cannot render them
false — they are true or false at the moment spoken.
IV. Statements About the Present That Necessarily
Incorporate Predictions
Take as a second example the following statement: “Our litigation
reserves are adequate.” Does this statement describe the current state
of the company's nances, thus not qualifying as forward-looking? Or
does this statement's description of the present status of reserves
qualify as forward-looking because the adequacy of reserves is, by ne-
cessity, premised on a prediction of future claims?
A. Courts Are Split In Their Treatment of Statements
About the Present That Necessarily Incorporate Predic-
tions.
Several courts have rejected the notion that a present-tense state-
ment, which necessarily incorporates a prediction, should be treated
as a forward-looking statement.71 For example, in Miller v. Champion
Enterprises, Inc., the Sixth Circuit refused to characterize as forward-
looking a present charge that the company had decided to take as a
result of the bankruptcy of its largest independent retailer, despite
the calculation's incorporation of predictions: “Even if some of the
components are somewhat uncertain and dependent on future events,
it nevertheless describes Champion's present calculation.”72 Similarly,
in In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Securities Litigation, the First Circuit
refused to treat as forward-looking the statement that the company
“has on hand . . . sucient resources to meet its anticipated [needs].”73
Although the suciency of the resources on hand was dependent on
the predicted needs, the First Circuit held that “[t]he part of the
statement that speaks of the quantity of cash on hand speaks of a
present fact.”74
A number of other courts have applied a more nuanced approach,
treating present-tense statements that necessarily rely on predictions
as forward-looking statements within the scope of the safe harbor. For
example, the Third Circuit classied a statement about collectability
as forward-looking because it was “a prediction of the likelihood of col-
lection on change orders and claims”75 and, in a separate case, treated
as forward-looking a company's reference to its pricing as “disciplined”
because “[t]he term ‘disciplined’ pricing describes a policy of setting
[Vol. 39:4 2011] Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor's Rocky Shore
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prices in relation to future medical costs.”76 Applying the same reason-
ing, other courts have categorized as forward-looking statements about
the adequacy of the company's “current reserves and liability cover-
age”77 and “assertions about the adequacy of the Company's loss
reserves.”78
B. Recommendation: Apply the Safe Harbor to Present
Statements Necessarily Incorporating Predictions.
This essay, drawing from the text of the statute and policy
rationales, argues that courts should apply the safe harbor to present
statements that necessarily incorporate predictions. Applying this rec-
ommendation to the example cited above — “Our litigation reserves
are adequate”79 — this essay contends that this statement should be
treated as forward-looking because the adequacy of reserves necessar-
ily depends on a prediction of future claims.
First, the denition of “forward-looking statement” includes state-
ments “containing a projection of . . . nancial items.”80 Webster's 3rd
New International Dictionary denes “contain” as “to have within:
hold;”81 and the New Oxford American Dictionary denes “contain” as
“be made up of (a number of things); consist of.”82 Arguably, a state-
ment about the present that necessarily incorporates predictions also
contains predictions, albeit embedded.
Moreover, Congress's primary concern when enacting the safe
harbor for forward-looking statements — encouraging companies to
speak about the future without fear that a subsequent turn of events
could subject them to liability83 — is implicated by statements about
the present that, by necessity, incorporate predictions about the
future. When making these types of statement, companies are likely
concerned that future events will render them incorrect. Reasonably,
companies may refrain from making these types of statement except
when compelled to do so, contrary to Congress's goal of encouraging
disclosure. Therefore, statements in this category merit safe harbor
protection.
C. Caveat: A Present Statement Does Not Necessarily
Incorporate A Prediction If Its Falsity Is Independent of the
Prediction.
Explaining why it refused to characterize as forward-looking the
statement that the company “has on hand . . . sucient resources to
meet its anticipated [needs],” the First Circuit drew the following
analogy:
To illustrate the distinction we draw, assume as hypothetical facts that
an issuer of securities relating to a business venture carrying an obvious
risk of liability (say, the operation of an amusement park) issues a pub-
lic statement that it has procured liability insurance in amounts suf-
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cient to cover the maximum liability that can be anticipated based on
comparable experience. Assume that in the suit, the aspect of the state-
ment alleged to be fraudulent lies not in the estimation of likely li-
abilities, but in the fact that the issuer was lying in stating that it had
obtained insurance. It in fact had no insurance policy. . . . We do not
think Congress intended to grant safe harbor protection for such a state-
ment whose falsity consists of a lie about a present fact.84
This essay, although disagreeing with the First Circuit's application
of this analogy to the alleged misrepresentation in that case,85 agrees
with the court's hypothetical scenario. As recommended by this essay,
a present statement should be shielded only if it necessarily
incorporates a prediction. In the First Circuit's hypothetical scenario,
the representation that insurance has been purchased does not neces-
sarily incorporate a prediction and thus should not be treated as
forward-looking. If, on the other hand, a plainti contended that the
insurance, albeit purchased, was inadequate to cover anticipated li-
abilities, the portion of the statement referring to the suciency of
the liability coverage should be protected because it necessarily relies
on a prediction.
Let's apply this caveat to the example cited above — “Our litigation
reserves are adequate”86 — by hypothesizing that, at the time this
statement was made, the company did not have any litigation
reserves. Under those facts, the statement would be actionable
because the portion of this statement that is false — the presence of
litigation reserves — does not necessarily depend on a prediction of
future claims.
D. Caveat: The Dodd-Frank Act Excludes Credit Ratings
from the Scope of the Securities Exchange Act's Safe
Harbor.
Applying this essay's recommendations, credit ratings should be
classied as forward-looking statements. Although a credit rating
arguably states an opinion about the present, that opinion necessarily
relies on predictions about the issuer's “ability and willingness to
make timely payments on outstanding obligations.”87 Therefore, just
like statements about the adequacy of reserves, a credit rating should
fall within the scope of the safe harbor.88
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
supersedes this analysis, however, by expressly providing that “state-
ments made by a credit rating agency . . . shall not be deemed
forward-looking statements for the purposes of section 21E.”89
Congress's inclusion of this provision in the Dodd-Frank Act sug-
gests that Congress believes that credit ratings would otherwise be
classied as forward-looking statements.90 In other words, it suggests
that Congress, consistent with this essay, interprets the denition of
[Vol. 39:4 2011] Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor's Rocky Shore
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forward-looking statement as including statements about the present
that necessarily rely on predictions.
Finally, in an interesting twist, the Dodd-Frank Act excludes credit
ratings only from the Securities Exchange Act’s safe harbor provision,
not from the Securities Act’s safe harbor provision.91 Therefore, credit
rating agencies may be able to rely on the safe harbor's protection as
a defense to claims under § 11 of the Securities Act.92
V. Statements Containing Present and Future Components
Take as a nal example the following statement: “Our production
capacity is growing and will continue to do so.” Is this statement
forward-looking, because it refers to future production capacity, or is
it non-forward-looking, because it refers to the state of production
capacity at the moment of speaking?
This essay refers to this category of statements as “statements
containing present and future components.” Statements falling within
the scope of the above-discussed categories of “statements of historical
or current fact that underlie predictions” and “statements about the
present that necessarily incorporate predictions” should not be
analyzed here. Rather, this category of statements is limited to those
like the above example, where the statement is simultaneously one of
“futurity and concurrence.”93
A. Courts Are Split In Their Treatment of Statements
Containing Present and Future Components.
Several courts treat statements with both present and future
components as forward-looking, declining to exclude the present
components from the reach of the safe harbor. For example, in Harris
v. Ivax, the Eleventh Circuit characterized the statement “the chal-
lenges unique to this period in our history are now behind us” as
entirely forward-looking, despite its connotation that the company
was not facing the unique challenges at the time that the statement
was made.94
Other courts, engaging in a more nuanced analysis, separate these
statements into their present and future components, extending safe
harbor protection only to the predictive parts of the statements.95 For
example, in Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., on remand
from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit bifurcated the state-
ment that “sales of its 5500 system were ‘still going strong’ ’’ into two
components.96 The court recognized that the company was saying
“both that current sales were strong and that they would continue to
be so.”97 Therefore, to the extent that current sales were not strong,
the safe harbor would not protect the statement.98 Similarly, the court
in In re Boeing Securities Litigation recognized that the statement
“[Boeing] is experiencing a near-term decline in productivity” contains
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both present and future components: “The ‘near-term’ part of this
statement suggests that Boeing will experience a short term decline
in productivity, but the ‘is experiencing’ part of the statement
indicates that it is already happening.”99 The court thus characterized
only the part of the statement that is projecting the future as forward-
looking.100
B. Recommendation: Separate Statements Into Present
and Future Components.
This essay, drawing from the text of the statute and policy
rationales, argues that courts should separate statements containing
both present and future components into their component parts,
extending safe harbor protection only to the predictive components.
Applying this recommendation to the example cited above — “Our
production capacity is growing and will continue to do so”101 — the
statement should be bifurcated. The statement about current growth
in production capacity should not be protected by the safe harbor,
while the statement about future growth in capacity should be
protected.
By its own terms, the statute applies only to “forward-looking
statements.”102 Therefore, extending safe harbor coverage to present
components of a statement would expand the statute beyond its text.
Moreover, the primary policy underlying the safe harbor — encourag-
ing predictive speech103 — is not implicated by present components of
statements (to the extent those present components do not necessarily
rely on predictions). Finally, insulating false statements of present
fact, merely because they are coupled with predictive statements,
would interfere with the securities fraud statute's goal of maintaining
“public condence in the marketplace . . . by deterring fraud.”104
C. Caveat: A Mere Assertion that the Present Situation
Makes the Prediction Attainable Is Not Separable from the
Prediction.
The Third Circuit, which generally agrees with this essay's recom-
mended treatment of statements containing present and future
implications, has recognized an exception where the present compo-
nent of the statement is inseparable from the future component. In
Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, the Third Circuit character-
ized as purely forward-looking the statements “our rst quarter
results position us to meet our goals for the year” and “we are on
track to meet our goals for the year.”105 The court recognized that the
“position us” and “on track” components of the statements referenced
the present, but the court further reasoned that these portions “can-
not meaningfully be distinguished from the future projection of which
they are a part.”106 These components of the statements “say only
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that, whatever that situation is, it makes the future projection
attainable.”107 The court noted that “[s]uch an assertion is necessarily
implicit in every future projection.”108
In contrast, several other courts have separated even these types of
present components from the forward-looking components of
statements. For example, in In re Copper Mountain Securities Litiga-
tion, the court held that the statement that the company was “on
track” to meet its future goals had present and future components,
which could be bifurcated: “[T]o the extent that such statements rested
upon a characterization of the present state of the company, such
statements are not properly considered forward-looking.”109
This essay argues that the Third Circuit's caveat is appropriate.
Every prediction carries with it the implicit representation that the
current state of aairs is consistent with achievement of the
prediction. Merely enunciating this implicit representation should not
transform the prediction into an actionable statement, lest the policy
underlying the safe harbor — encouraging companies to make predic-
tions — be contravened.
VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, this essay argues that courts should adopt the follow-
ing recommendations when analyzing whether mixed statements are
forward-looking, so as to fall within the scope of the PSLRA's
protection: (1) statements of historical or current fact should not be
protected by the safe harbor, even if they underlie predictions; (2)
statements about the present that necessarily incorporate predictions
should be protected by the safe harbor; and (3) statements that contain
both present and future components should be bifurcated, with the
safe harbor protecting only those portions that predict the future.
These recommendations are consistent with the statutory text and
further the policy rationales underlying the safe harbor. Finally, these
recommendations, if adopted, would provide meaningful guidance to
companies who make mixed statements about the limits of the safe
harbor's protection, lest they inadvertently end up on the rocky shore.
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